Austin Winkelman is a proud, born-and-raised native of Minnesota’s 6th Congressional District. Born in Buffalo in 1985 and raised in Section 8 housing, Austin attended Monticello public schools where he gained firsthand experience with the challenges working families face. Determined to build a better life, he pursued higher education at Hennepin Technical College, earning a diploma in Plastics Engineering Technology, graduating with a 3.71 GPA, and receiving two occupational certificates in injection and extrusion molding.

Like so many Minnesotans, Austin has spent his life working hand to mouth, fighting for dignity, opportunity, and fairness. He became an entrepreneur, founding Plastic Man LLC in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin, where he served as owner-operator for four years. True to his values, Austin transformed his business into an employee-owned cooperative managed democratically—because he believes workers deserve a real voice in the economy.

Today, Austin is a stay-at-home dad raising four incredible children to be responsible, compassionate, and respectful of all people. His family reflects the values of diversity, inclusion, and empathy that guide his campaign and his life.

Austin first ran for office in the 2024 Democratic primary, giving voice to his concerns over woman’s Reproductive Rights by Washington elites. Now he is returning in 2026 as a grassroots independent candidate allied with Democrats, determined to unseat Tom Emmer and put people before corporations. His campaign is built on progressive values: taxing the wealthy, standing up to entrenched oligarchy, and protecting the rights and freedoms of every American.

Austin Winkelman is committed to building an economy that works for everyone, not just the privileged few. Together, the people of District 6 will fight for democracy, justice, and opportunity. United we stand, divided we fall.

A historically inspired fiscal plan modeled on post-WWII tax policy, updated for the modern U.S. economy. Inspired by the successful post-WWII approach, this plan targets debt reduction through: Progressive taxation, corporate accountability, Strategic growth investments, and Responsible budgeting.

 It’s designed to:

1. Stabilize and reduce the debt.

2. Ensure fairness and broad-based prosperity.

3. Maintain long-term U.S. economic strength and independence.

 Progressive Tax Reform:

Restore High Marginal Rates on Ultra-High Incomes Top marginal income tax rate: 90% on income over $10 million/year for the top 1%, Step-up rates starting at $1 million, $5 million, and $10 million tiers.

Estimated Revenue: $100–150 billion/year

Corporate Tax Reform:

Raise the corporate tax rate to 42%, roughly the post-WWII average. Eliminate loopholes that allow profit-shifting overseas. Impose a minimum effective tax rate of 42% on corporate profits.

Estimated Revenue: $200–300 billion/year

Capital Gains & Wealth

Tax capital gains at the same rate as regular income for those earning over $1 million/year. End the carried interest loophole. Implement a 3% tax on net wealth over $50 million, scaling up with wealth.

Estimated Revenue: $150 billion/year

Broaden the Tax Base Fairly

Maintain existing middle-class tax rates. Expand IRS enforcement to reduce tax evasion, especially by high earners, Modernize the IRS with AI auditing tools to catch complex avoidance schemes.

Estimated Revenue from enforcement improvements: $100+ billion/year

Economic Growth Through Strategic Investment

Education & Workforce:

Expand funding for public universities, trade schools, and STEM training, Incentivize domestic manufacturing and green tech job creation.

Infrastructure:

Invest in smart infrastructure, clean energy, housing, and public transportation.

Goal: Sustain GDP growth at 3–4% annually, similar to post-WWII years.

Debt Management Strategy

Short-Term (Years 1–5):

Stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Medium-Term (Years 6–15):

Begin reducing absolute debt levels gradually.

Reinvest savings from lower interest payments into education and innovation.

Long-Term (15+ Years):

Reduce debt to below 60% of GDP, allowing flexibility for future crises.

Total Estimated Annual Revenue Gains:

1. High-income taxes: $100–150B

2. Corporate taxes: $200–300B

3. Capital gains & wealth: $150B

4. IRS modernization/enforcement: $100B+

Total: $550–700B/year

Waging War on Wealth with a Post-WWII Style Tax Policy:

Fiscal and Economic Analysis

Austin Winkelman for Congress 2026

Introduction and Policy Overview

In this analysis, we evaluate the effects of repealing the 2017 Trump-era tax cuts and implementing a

modernized version of post–World War II U.S. tax policy. During the post-WWII era (1940s–1960s), the U.S.

tax code featured very high progressive rates – top marginal income tax rates above 90% and corporate tax rates

around 50% – alongside a broader tax base. We consider a proposal that emulates that framework, updated for

today’s economy. The key policy assumptions include:

 Full repeal of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) for individuals and businesses. This restores

pre-2018 tax rates and rules (e.g. the top individual rate returns to 39.6% from 37%, lower brackets

revert to their higher pre-TCJA levels, the standard deduction and child credit revert, the corporate rate

returns at least to 35%, etc.). It also removes TCJA limits like the cap on state and local tax (SALT)

deductions.

 A 90% top marginal income tax rate on annual taxable income over $10 million (restoring a high

bracket similar to the 91% top rate in the 1950s). Incomes below $10 million would continue to be taxed

at graduated rates (which, after TCJA repeal, range up to 39.6%). Only the portion of income above $10

million faces the 90% rate.

 Taxing capital gains as ordinary income for high earners. Investment income (long-term capital

gains and qualified dividends) currently enjoys a top rate of 20%, but under this plan, for individuals in

the highest brackets, capital gains/dividends would be taxed at the same rates as wages. This eliminates

the preferential treatment of capital income for the wealthy. (In practice, that means wealthy investors

could face up to 90% on gains above the $10M threshold, removing a major avenue of tax avoidance.)

 Raising the corporate tax rate to 42%. This is a substantial increase from the current 21% (established

by the TCJA) and even above the pre-2018 rate of 35%. It approaches the historical highs of the 1950s–

60s (when the federal corporate tax rate was 46% and effective rates sometimes exceeded 50% with

certain surcharges). The higher corporate rate today aims to recapture corporate revenues similar to mid-

20th-century levels.

 A 1% annual wealth tax on ultra-high net worth. An annual tax of 1% on net household wealth

above $50 million. (For example, a household worth $100M would pay 1% of $50M, i.e. $500,000 per

year.) This is a relatively modest wealth tax (compared to some proposals of 2%–3%) but would

generate new revenue from large fortunes. Strong anti-evasion measures and enforcement funding

would accompany this tax, as in recent wealth tax proposals.

 Repeal of recent global tariffs and trade-war duties. All tariffs imposed in the late 2010s (such as

broad tariffs on Chinese imports, steel and aluminum, etc.) are assumed to be removed. This would

return trade policy to a free(er) trade stance, lowering import costs. The effects on trade volumes, GDP,

and prices from tariff elimination are taken into account in the dynamic analysis.

These combined policies represent a dramatic shift toward progressive taxation reminiscent of the mid-20th

century but implemented in a contemporary context. The analysis below details the fiscal impact on the

federal budget (revenue gains and deficit reduction over 15- and 30-year horizons), the distribution of the tax

burden (by income group, corporate sector, and state), and the dynamic economic effects (including growth,

inflation, interest rates, and behavioral responses).

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Impact on Federal Budget: Revenue Gains and Deficit Reduction

Overall Revenue Increase: Replacing the TCJA with this aggressive tax regime would yield a very large

increase in federal revenue. On a static basis (i.e. not yet accounting for macroeconomic feedback), we estimate

on the order of $10–12 trillion in additional revenue over the next 15 years, and roughly $25–30 trillion

over 30 years. This would represent a massive deficit reduction, substantially shrinking the federal debt

trajectory. For context, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that simply extending the 2017 tax

cuts for another decade (2025–2034) would add about $4.5 trillion to deficits; by not extending and instead

repealing those cuts, that ~$4+ trillion stays in the Treasury. Each major component of the proposal contributes

to the revenue gains, as summarized in Table 1:

Policy Change

Estimated 15-Year

Revenue Gain (2025–

2039)

Estimated 30-Year

Revenue Gain (2025–

2054)

Repeal of 2017 Tax Cuts (TCJA) – restore individual

rates, standard deduction, etc.

~$6–7 trillion ~$12–15 trillion

90% Top Income Tax Rate (on income > $10M) +

Taxing Capital Gains at Ordinary Rates for high

earners

~$2–3 trillion ~$5–6 trillion

Corporate Tax Rate to 42% (from 21%) ~$5–6 trillion ~$12–18 trillion

1% Wealth Tax (net worth > $50M) ~$1–2 trillion ~$3–4 trillion

Repeal of Tariffs (loss of customs revenue) (–) ~$1 trillion (–) ~$2–3 trillion

Total Additional Revenue – Static ≈ $12 trillion ≈ $30 trillion

Total Additional Revenue – Dynamic (approx.) ≈ $10 trillion ≈ $25 trillion

Table 1: Rough estimates of cumulative revenue increases from each component over 15- and 30-year horizons.

Static figures sum to about $12T (15yr) and $30T (30yr). Dynamic scoring (accounting for economic feedback

and behavioral changes) might reduce the totals by ~15–20%, as shown in the last row. These are in nominal

dollars over the period.

Sources: Joint Committee on Taxation estimates for TCJA extension costs; Penn Wharton Budget Model

analysis for wealth tax revenue; historical corporate tax share of GDP; Tax Foundation and CBO data on tariff

revenue; see text for details and assumptions.

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Breakdown of the Revenue Estimates

 Repealing the Trump Tax Cuts: The TCJA (2017) significantly lowered individual tax rates

(especially for higher incomes) and cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. Most individual

provisions were set to expire after 2025, but if they were extended, JCT estimates a revenue loss of

~$4.0–4.5 trillion over 10 years. By fully repealing TCJA, we gain back roughly that amount in the

first decade. Over 15 years, that figure grows further (as the economy and income levels expand).

Simply restoring pre-2018 tax law for individuals (top rate back to 39.6%, standard deduction halved,

child credit reduced, etc.) would generate several trillion in new revenue through 2039. For example,

just letting the top individual rate revert to 39.6% (from 37%) for high incomes above ~$600k was

estimated to raise about $20 billion per year. Across all individual provisions, the recouped revenue is

on the order of $6–7 trillion/15 years. This directly reduces deficits (since government outlays are

assumed unaffected).

 90% Top Marginal Rate on Income > $10M: Adding a new 90% bracket for ultra-high incomes

will further boost revenue from the very wealthy. However, the taxable base for this rate is relatively

small – only the portion of income above $10 million for each top-earner. According to IRS data, in

2022 there were about ~25,000 households with over $10 million in adjusted gross income (the top

0.01% or so). Collectively, this group reported about $1.05 trillion of income. Under current law, only a

fraction of that income is actually taxed in the top bracket: one analysis found that only 15% of the

$1.05T (about $162 billion) would be subject to the 39.6% rate in effect if the top bracket reverted. The

other ~85% is either taxed at lower rates (the portions under $10M), or receives special treatment (e.g.

capital gains and dividends at only 20%, or 20% pass-through business deduction, etc.). This highlights

why simply raising the top statutory rate can have limited reach – most of the income of the super-rich

is shielded from the top rate under current rules. Our plan addresses that by taxing capital gains at

ordinary rates and eliminating the pass-through deduction for high earners, which broadens the base of

income that would face the 90% rate. In static terms, if even, say, $500 billion of that ultra-high-end

income ends up taxed at 90% instead of the current ~20% effective rate, the additional revenue is

substantial (an extra 70% on that $500B = $350B per year). Realistically, behavioral responses

(discussed later) would shrink that, but it indicates the scale. We project the 90% rate (plus capital gains

reform) could yield on the order of $2–3 trillion over 15 years, and around $5+ trillion over 30 years,

on top of the TCJA repeal. This assumes aggressive enforcement and that high earners do not massively

curtail their economic activity (again, see dynamic section). Notably, historical precedent: in the 1950s

when the top rate was 91%, very few taxpayers actually paid that rate – effective tax rates for the top

0.01% were around 45%, due to avoidance and tax shelters. Our proposal attempts to mitigate that

through base-broadening (fewer loopholes), but it is unlikely the full 90% of every dollar would be

collected.

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 Corporate Tax Rate at 42%: The increase in the corporate income tax from 21% to 42% (a doubling)

is one of the largest sources of revenue. Pre-TCJA, the corporate rate was 35%; going to 42% exceeds

that, approaching the 48% rate that prevailed in the 1950s–60s. Corporate tax receipts have fallen

dramatically as a share of GDP over the past decades – in the 1950s the federal corporate tax yielded

about 5% of GDP in revenue annually, versus around 1% of GDP in recent years. By raising the rate

(and assuming fewer loopholes are available), corporate tax collections could rise closer to their midcentury

levels. For example, the bipartisan Joint Committee on Taxation projected that the TCJA

business tax changes (including the corporate cut to 21%) would reduce revenues by ~$1.5 trillion over

2018–2027. Independent analyses suggest each percentage-point increase in the corporate rate yields

on the order of $100 billion over 10 years (though it’s not linear at extremes). A rough rule: increasing

the rate by 1 point (21%→22%) raises ~$100B/decade; so a 21-point increase (to 42%) could raise

ballpark ~$2.1 trillion per decade before behavioral effects. This is in line with other comparisons – for

instance, the Penn Wharton Budget Model found that raising the corporate rate from 21% to 36%

would raise roughly $5.2 trillion over 10 years on a conventional static basis. Going up to 42% (6

points higher) would add further revenue (potentially ~$6–7 trillion/decade static). For 15 years, we

estimate about $5–6 trillion could be raised, and $12–18 trillion over 30 years (the wide range reflects

uncertainty in profit growth and avoidance behavior). It’s worth noting that many large corporations

currently pay well below the statutory 21% due to deductions and credits. Post-TCJA, the average

effective tax rate for profitable Fortune 500 firms was only ~13%. Our estimate assumes the effective

rate would rise significantly under a 42% statutory rate (perhaps into the 25–30% range on average after

loopholes), which is plausible if reforms accompany the rate hike.

– Corporate Sector Examples: The TCJA’s corporate cut dramatically lowered tax bills for many

companies. For example, Verizon saw its effective tax rate drop from 21% to 8%, saving about $10.7

billion in taxes over 2018–2021. Walmart’s effective rate fell from 31% to 17%, saving about $9.0

billion. AT&T went from 13% to 3%, a savings of $8.2 billion. Reverting to a high corporate rate

would reclaim much of these savings for the Treasury. We anticipate the biggest revenue gains would

come from sectors that benefited most from the rate cut. Industries that had large drops in effective tax

rates – for instance, the electronics/tech sector saw a >20 percentage-point drop (from ~31% to 9%)

after 2017 – would likely contribute heavily to the revenue surge as their tax bills rise. In contrast, some

industries that already exploit many tax breaks might see less change. Notably, motor vehicles, oil &

gas, and utilities had effective tax rates near 0% even before 2017 (through use of credits,

accelerated depreciation, etc.), and thus saw little change post-TCJA. Without closing loopholes, those

particular sectors still might not pay anywhere near 42%. (For example, oil companies often shelter

profits, sometimes even receiving net tax rebates.) Our revenue estimates assume complementary

measures to broaden the corporate tax base, so that highly profitable firms in tech, finance,

pharmaceuticals, etc., cannot easily avoid the higher rate. Overall, the corporate tax hike is a cornerstone

of the deficit reduction, potentially contributing roughly one-third to one-half of the total new revenue

over 30 years.

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 1% Wealth Tax on $50M+: Taxing extreme wealth directly would add a new stream of revenue. While

a 1% rate seems small, the base (ultra-wealthy fortunes) is enormous and highly concentrated. For

example, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s more aggressive wealth tax proposal (2% on $50M+ and 3% on

$1B+) was estimated to raise about $3 trillion over 10 years by economists Saez and Zucman. The

Penn Wharton Budget Model’s analysis of that plan (accounting for some evasion) projected about

$2.1–2.7 trillion over 10 years under conventional scoring. Our 1% flat tax is roughly one-half to onethird

the intensity of Warren’s, so a rough static estimate is around $1–1.5 trillion per decade in

revenue. We assume about $1.2 trillion per 10 years initially, growing in later decades as wealth

accumulates (tempered slightly by the tax itself slowing that accumulation). Over 15 years, that could be

~$1.5–2T; over 30 years, perhaps ~$3–4T. These figures already factor in some level of

avoidance/evasion (for example, wealthy individuals might attempt to undervalue assets or shift

residency abroad). To enforce the tax, increased IRS resources and anti-evasion measures (like those in

Warren’s plan, e.g. a 30% audit rate for the ultra-wealthy and an exit tax on expatriation) are assumed.

Even with enforcement, actual yield could be lower; PWBM found that including macroeconomic

effects and avoidance could reduce the 10-year take by about 17% (from $2.4T to $2.0T). In our

dynamic projections, we account for a similar discount. Importantly, this wealth tax is highly targeted: it

would affect at most ~0.05% of households (around 100,000 families) – those with net worth over $50M

– and 99.95% of Americans would not pay this tax. Thus, it concentrates revenue collection on the

richest families, aligning with the progressive intent of the post-WWII-style system. The revenue gained

would directly reduce the deficit unless spent; here we assume it’s used for deficit reduction.

 Tariff Repeal (Negative Revenue Impact): One component of our plan actually reduces revenue:

eliminating the Trump-era tariffs means the government forgoes the customs duties that were being

collected on imports. However, these tariff revenues are relatively small in the context of the other tax

changes. At their peak, tariffs imposed since 2018 were generating about $5-7 billion per month, or

roughly ~$60–80 billion per year in revenue (paid by importers). Over 10 years that might be ~$0.7

trillion. One analysis by the Tax Foundation found that all the tariffs implemented would have raised

about $2.0 trillion over a decade on a static basis (this presumably includes assumed

continuation/expansion of tariffs), but only $1.4 trillion on a dynamic basis once you account for

economic drag. In our scenario, those tariffs are gone, so we lose that revenue stream – call it on the

order of $100 billion per year at most. Over 15 years, that’s roughly -$1 to -$1.5 trillion less revenue;

over 30 years, perhaps -$2 to -$3T (as shown in Table 1). However, as we detail under dynamic effects,

removing tariffs is expected to boost economic growth and thereby increase other tax revenues (income,

profits), which can partially offset the loss. Additionally, since the tariffs were effectively a tax mostly

borne by U.S. consumers (through higher prices), removing them does put money back in consumers’

pockets, somewhat analogous to a tax cut. We assume here that the net effect of tariff repeal on the

budget is roughly a wash in the long term once macro feedbacks are included (i.e. lost tariff dollars are

replaced by higher income and sales tax receipts from a larger economy).

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Deficit and Debt Effects: Taken together, these policies would markedly reduce the federal deficit each year.

By 2030, annual revenues could be several percentage points of GDP higher than under current law, while

outlays are assumed unchanged. For example, if current-law revenues are ~18% of GDP, this plan might push

them above 22–23% of GDP (comparable to the high revenue years during WWII and the 1950s). Over 15

years, the cumulative deficit reduction (pre-interest) is roughly equal to the revenue gains (around $12T). Over

30 years, if ~$25–30T extra is collected, that is an enormous dent in the national debt. To illustrate, $25 trillion

is about equal to the entire current public debt – effectively, this plan could stabilize or even reduce the debtto-

GDP ratio over time, depending on spending levels. In practice, some of the revenue might be used for new

spending priorities, but for this analysis we assume it’s all saving. One must also consider interest savings:

lower deficits mean the government borrows less, so interest costs on the debt would also be lower than

baseline. This compounds the deficit reduction (a virtuous cycle). By CBO estimates, every $1 of deficit

reduction yields some additional savings in interest – for instance, preventing $4.5T of new deficits (the TCJA

extension cost) avoids hundreds of billions in interest costs over the decade. Thus, the debt trajectory improves

even more when interest is accounted for. Overall, federal debt in 30 years would be vastly lower than under

current policies – potentially tens of trillions lower – improving fiscal sustainability. (Of course, such high

taxation could have other economic side-effects, which we explore below.)

Distributional Effects: Who Pays and Where the Revenue Comes

From

A critical aspect of returning to a post-WWII-style tax system is the highly progressive distribution of the tax

burden. In other words, the bulk of the new revenue will come from those most able to pay – the wealthy

individuals, large corporations (and by extension their shareholders and owners), and the richest estates. We

break down the impacts by income group, by corporate sector, and by geography (state/region):

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By Individual Income Bracket

High-Income Households (Top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01%): These groups would bear the lion’s share of the tax

increases. Between the 90% marginal rate, the ordinary tax on capital gains/dividends, and the 1% wealth tax,

the ultra-rich are targeted from multiple angles. We estimate that well over 90% of the additional individual

income-tax revenue would come from the top 5% of earners, and a plurality from the top 0.1% alone. In

fact, just the new 90% bracket on $10M+ incomes is almost exclusively a top 0.01% measure. To put numbers

on it: households making over $10M (roughly 0.01% of filers) currently report about $1 trillion in income;

however, due to various breaks, only ~$162 billion of that was subject to the previous top rate. Under our plan,

a far larger portion of their income would be exposed to the top rate (because capital gains and business income

would no longer get special low rates). Thus, the very-rich will pay dramatically more. Effective tax rates for

billionaires and millionaires would rise substantially – potentially into the 50–60%+ range of their total

income, compared to effective rates often in the 20% range today.

It’s important to note that historically, even when statutory rates were 70%–90%, the effective tax rate paid by

top earners was much lower. For example, in the late 1950s when the top marginal rate was 91%, the top

0.01% of taxpayers paid on average about 45% of their income in federal taxes. This gap was due to tax

avoidance opportunities and exclusions. Our plan, by taxing capital gains at 90% for high incomes and adding a

wealth tax, tries to reduce that gap. If successful, the effective tax rate on those earning $10M+ could approach

the statutory 90% on the margin. Realistically, many wealthy individuals will employ strategies to not realize

income above $10M (for instance, taking more stock options and fewer cash salaries, deferring asset sales, etc.).

Even so, the combination of the wealth tax (which taxes unrealized wealth growth at 1% annually) and ordinary

treatment of capital gains means the rich cannot escape forever – if they hold assets, the wealth tax collects

some revenue each year, and if they sell assets, the 90% rate applies at that moment. Thus, in the long run the

top 0.01% would contribute a vastly increased share of federal revenue.

For slightly broader high-income groups: the top 1% of households (roughly those above ~$800,000 annual

income) would also pay more, though those with incomes below $10M don’t hit the 90% bracket. They would

still be affected by the repeal of the TCJA (restoring the 39.6% bracket on ~$600k+ incomes, removing certain

deductions) and by the higher tax on capital gains if they have investment income. Many in the $1M–$10M

income range also likely have net worth above $50M (especially at the upper end), so they could owe the 1%

wealth tax too. We anticipate the top 1% will fund a major portion of the individual income tax increase

(probably the majority of it when combined with the top 0.1%). The upper-middle class and middle class

would see relatively smaller changes. For instance, middle-income taxpayers would mainly see the TCJA tax

cuts expire – e.g. the 22% bracket reverting to 25%, the child tax credit shrinking, etc. This does mean a tax

increase relative to current law, but those provisions were scheduled to expire in 2025 anyway. The bottom

50% of households would see minimal direct tax change – many pay little federal income tax now and that

would remain so. We do not assume any changes to payroll taxes in this scenario, so the working class isn’t

directly hit aside from any indirect economic shifts.

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To illustrate distribution: one analysis found that over 60% of the TCJA’s tax cuts in 2025 accrue to the top

20% of households, and over one-third to the top 1%. By reversing the TCJA, those gains are taken away

largely from the top. And by raising new taxes at the top, we tilt the system much more progressive than it was

even pre-2017. In fact, under this plan the tax code would likely become the most progressive in modern

U.S. history, with record-high average tax rates on millionaires. Lower and middle-income families would

mainly return to the Clinton/Bush/Obama-era tax levels (slightly higher than 2018-2024, but nowhere near the

burdens on the rich).

Another perspective: income inequality would be expected to decrease as a result of these taxes. High earners

would retain a much smaller share of their gross income after tax. Empirical research supports this outcome –

periods of higher top marginal rates have seen compressed after-tax income distributions. In our case, a 90%

rate is almost confiscatory on the margin, which effectively caps how much of each extra dollar above $10M

one can keep (only 10 cents). This acts to curb extreme accumulations of income (and wealth, via the wealth

tax) over time. While exact distributional tables would require a microsimulation model, qualitatively the top

0.1% and top 1% would shoulder the vast majority of the new taxes, the next 4% (95th–99th percentile,

roughly $200k–$800k incomes) would pay a moderate amount more (mostly via the end of the TCJA cuts and

some indirect corporate tax incidence), and the bottom ~95% of households would pay little change in income

taxes (with some paying slightly more than today due to lost TCJA cuts, but no new surtaxes). Notably, if the

wealthy attempt to shift income back into corporations to avoid the 90% individual rate (a known historical

behavior), the higher 42% corporate tax ensures that income is still taxed heavily somewhere, and when profits

eventually flow to shareholders, they’d face dividend taxes at ordinary rates. Thus, most avenues lead to

additional tax payment at some point.

By Corporate Sector and Business Type

On the business side, the burden of the corporate tax increase would fall differently across industries. Post-

TCJA, some industries effectively paid very low tax rates. As mentioned, industries like utilities, oil & gas,

and automakers had so many tax breaks (credits, accelerated depreciation, etc.) that their effective tax rates

were near zero both before and after 2017. Unless tax expenditure reforms accompany the rate hike, these

particular sectors might continue to pay low effective rates. For instance, many utility companies pass through

tax savings to customers and have tax credits; oil companies can use depletion allowances, etc. In contrast,

highly profitable tech and financial companies generally paid closer to the full 21% (or at least in the teens)

after TCJA, so they would likely end up paying closer to the new 42%.

Looking at data from 2018–2021: the overall effective federal tax rate for 296 big profitable U.S. corporations

was about 12.8% on $2.75 trillion of profits. If those same profits were taxed at 42% with no changes in

loopholes, taxes would triple (from ~$351B to ~$1.15T for that period). Of course, companies would respond –

some might invest less or try to shift profits abroad (transfer pricing, etc.). But assuming measures against

profit-shifting are strengthened (perhaps via a tougher minimum tax or international tax coordination), many

sectors would contribute significantly more. Notably:

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 The technology sector (particularly hardware/electronics) was a big winner from TCJA, dropping to

single-digit effective rates. Under a 42% regime, one would expect companies like Apple, Google, etc.,

to pay much higher taxes (unless they find new avoidance strategies). For example, Facebook (Meta)

paid around 18% effective tax post-TCJA on booming profits, versus ~28% before. If that jumped to,

say, 30% or more effective, Meta alone would pay billions more annually.

 Finance and banking: The financial sector had a moderate tax cut (their effective rate dropped from

~18% to ~12.5% on average). Big banks and financial firms would likely see their tax bills roughly

double in effective terms. However, financial firms can sometimes more easily shift income into noncorporate

entities or overseas, so enforcement would be key.

 Retail and pharmaceuticals: Retailers (like Walmart, Target) historically paid near full statutory rates

and got a sizable cut to ~16% effective. They would return to paying something closer to 40%.

Pharmaceutical companies often have intellectual property profit shifted to low-tax jurisdictions; a

crackdown on that would be needed or else they might avoid the full brunt.

 Pass-through businesses (partnerships, S-corps, etc.): Under TCJA, pass-throughs got a 20% income

deduction (199A) which effectively cut their top rate to ~29.6%. Our plan would repeal that deduction

(as part of TCJA repeal). So large pass-through entities (law firms, hedge funds, etc. that are not Ccorps)

would see their taxes go up as well – their income above $10M could face 90%. Some may

choose to convert to C-corporations to take advantage of the (relatively lower) 42% rate instead of 90%

personal, but then dividends out to owners would be taxed at 90%. Either way, the business income is

taxed heavily. The distribution between corporate and individual tax revenues might shift depending on

organizational form preferences, but the government’s total take remains high.

In summary, most sectors of the economy would contribute more under the higher corporate rate, but

especially those currently paying substantial taxes (tech, communications, healthcare, finance, retail). Sectors

that historically paid little (due to targeted tax breaks) would need those breaks curtailed to yield more revenue.

It’s likely that as part of a “post-WWII style” reform, many corporate tax expenditures would indeed be

revisited – akin to broadening the base as was done in the 1986 Tax Reform (but that time rates were lowered;

here we raise them). If base-broadening occurs (closing loopholes), it complements the high rates by preventing

avoidance. Our revenue estimates assumed a reasonably broad base at the higher rate.

Business Behavioral Note: Facing a 42% tax, corporations might respond in various ways. They could attempt

to shift profits abroad to lower-tax countries. This plan would likely reintroduce strong anti-inversion rules and

perhaps a global minimum tax to counter that (not detailed here, but could be part of “modernizing” the post-

WWII policy for a globalized economy). Companies might lobby for more deductions; policymakers might

allow some (e.g., accelerated depreciation might or might not be kept). All these factors influence which sectors

ultimately pay the most. However, in aggregate, the business sector would unquestionably send much more

revenue to Washington than under current law – roughly doubling the federal corporate tax take as a share of

GDP, from ~1% to perhaps ~2–3% of GDP, reversing a long decline.

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By State and Region

The geographic distribution of the revenue gains will mirror where high incomes and wealth are concentrated.

Generally, coastal high-income states and large population centers will contribute the most, simply

because that’s where most rich Americans and profitable corporations reside or do business. A few points:

 States with many wealthy residents: For example, California, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey,

Massachusetts, Illinois – these are states with high concentrations of millionaires and billionaires. They

will see a significant uptick in federal taxes paid. California alone has a large share of the nation’s high

earners (tech entrepreneurs, entertainment industry, etc.), and New York has a concentration of financial

industry high-earners. Even though California and New York’s wealthy had some of their federal tax cut

benefits blunted by the SALT deduction cap (which made their effective TCJA cut smaller), under our

plan the SALT cap is removed, but that is overshadowed by the much higher federal rates. To illustrate:

under a recent GOP tax proposal, the richest 1% in California would have gotten a federal tax cut

averaging “only” ~$35,000, whereas in Texas the top 1% stood to gain over $114,000 on average. That

disparity was largely because Californians lost more deduction (SALT) and thus couldn’t fully enjoy the

lower rates. In our plan, Californians get the SALT deduction back (which slightly helps them), but a

90% federal rate will far outweigh any deduction benefits. So wealthy Californians and New Yorkers

will pay much more than they do today – but relative to some no-income-tax states, their increase might

be slightly less on a percentage basis because they were already paying somewhat higher effective

federal tax under TCJA (due to SALT cap).

 States with no income tax or traditionally low-tax states (Texas, Florida, Wyoming, South Dakota,

Nevada, etc.): Paradoxically, the TCJA and its extensions tend to favor wealthy individuals in no-tax

states, because the SALT cap didn’t affect them (they had little/no state income tax to deduct anyway).

For instance, the top 1% in Wyoming, South Dakota, and Texas were projected to get enormous average

tax cuts (over $100k per household) from the recent Senate tax bill. In our reversal scenario, those

states’ wealthy will lose those big cuts and then some – they will now pay the 90% rate on their high

incomes. Texas and Florida, having many rich residents (and many corporate headquarters in Texas),

would likely see some of the largest absolute increases in federal taxes paid. For example, Texas has a

lot of high-income oil executives, athletes with big contracts, etc., who benefited from lower federal

rates and no state tax; now, their federal rate could skyrocket to 90%. The federal tax increase per

affluent Texan would be huge (six or seven figures for many individuals). Wyoming and South Dakota

have few people overall but a disproportionate number of ultra-wealthy (often ranching or trust fund

wealth) – those would face the wealth tax and any income above $10M at 90%. An important

consideration: some of these no-tax states actually intentionally attract wealth (South Dakota is known

for trust shelters). A federal wealth tax would pierce that advantage, ensuring that simply being in a notax

state doesn’t avoid federal tax.

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 Inequality between states: States vary in their income distributions. States like New York and

California have many of the top 0.1% but also large low-income populations. The rich in those

states will pay a lot more federally, but the middle class there won’t be as affected (beyond losing the

TCJA cut). States like Wyoming or South Dakota have few people, but the ones who are rich there will

pay a lot more – however, in absolute dollars it’s still smaller total revenue due to small population.

Texas and Florida are interesting: large populations and many wealthy – they will likely become some

of the largest net contributors under this tax regime. Florida, for instance, is home to many billionaires

(often retirees or finance people who moved for tax reasons); a 1% wealth tax and high income tax will

extract a lot from them, or could even prompt some to leave the country (a risk we note in dynamic

section).

 Federal revenue by state: Currently, states like New York, California, New Jersey, Massachusetts

consistently pay more in federal taxes than they receive in spending (so-called donor states), partly

because of higher incomes. This pattern would intensify. High-income “blue” states will send even more

money to D.C. via these taxes. States with lower incomes (often “red” states) might not see much

increase among their general population, only among the handful of rich residents. For example,

Mississippi or West Virginia have very few millionaires; most of their population would just see minor

changes. Thus, the geographic revenue concentration will map onto the geographic concentration of

wealth.

To quantify some extremes: According to analysis by ITEP, the richest 1% in Wyoming would have received a

$134,000 tax cut in 2026 under TCJA extension – highest in the nation. In our scenario, instead of a $134k cut,

that average household might see a several-hundred-thousand-dollar increase (because their federal tax rate

goes way up). Meanwhile, the richest 1% in California were looking at about a $35,000 tax cut on average (one

of the smallest, due to SALT); under our plan, they might see an increase perhaps in the mid six-figures on

average (since many California top 1% are actually in the top 0.1% nationally). New York similarly had around

a ~$52k average cut for the 1%; that would swing to a large increase. The state-by-state breakdown of

revenue would likely show the largest dollar contributions from the biggest, richest states: California and New

York could each account for a significant portion of the individual income and wealth tax receipts (owing to

their many high-net-worth individuals). Texas and Florida would also contribute heavily on the individual side

(Florida has no state tax but many wealthy retirees and businesspeople; Texas as discussed). On the corporate

side, revenue is sourced to where companies operate, which is nationwide, but profits might be attributed to

certain headquarters. States like Delaware (legal incorp) might formally show corporate tax payments, but

economically it’s nationwide.

In summary, wealthier states and urban areas would fund most of the increase, aligning with the overall

progressive structure. From an equity perspective, this is intentional: it is a transfer from high-income regions to

the federal government (which presumably uses it to pay down debt or fund programs benefiting all states).

Politically, this might be contentious (states with many rich might claim over-burden), but historically, during

WWII and after, high-income states paid a lot more and it was accepted as necessary for the national interest.

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Dynamic Economic Effects (Dynamic Scoring)

We now turn to dynamic scoring – how the proposed tax changes and tariff repeal would impact the broader

economy, and in turn feed back into revenues and deficits. Dynamic effects include changes in GDP growth,

inflation, interest rates, investment, labor supply, etc., due to the policy. We incorporate potential

macroeconomic and behavioral responses:

GDP Growth and Overall Economic Activity

On one hand, substantially higher tax rates on capital and high earners could dampen private investment and

work incentives, which would tend to reduce economic output relative to baseline (a negative supply-side

effect). On the other hand, deficit reduction and tariff elimination could boost growth by lowering interest costs,

reducing trade barriers, and improving resource allocation efficiency. The net effect is a mix of these forces:

 Capital Stock and Investment: Taxing corporate profits at 42% and high individual incomes (which

include a lot of business profits from partnerships, etc.) at 90% means the after-tax return on

investment drops for those investors. Standard economic theory suggests this will lead to somewhat

lower investment in the private sector – businesses might undertake fewer projects, or wealthy investors

might save less (since more of the return is taxed away). A wealth tax also directly makes holding

capital more expensive on an ongoing basis. The Penn Wharton model of Warren’s wealth tax, for

example, projected that by 2050 it would reduce the capital stock by about 3.1% and GDP by 1.2%

versus baseline. Our plan goes further in some respects (higher income and corporate taxes), so one

might expect a larger long-run GDP impact if looking in isolation. There’s a concept of a “revenuemaximizing

tax rate” (the top of the Laffer Curve) – estimates put that around 60–70% for top income

taxes under current conditions. Pushing the rate to 90% might exceed the optimal and actually yield

less additional work effort or even lower reported income to tax. However, because we also broaden the

base and add enforcement, we mitigate avoidance and thus can push the rate higher than otherwise. Still,

we should expect some shrinkage in the tax base due to behavioral changes – e.g., some

entrepreneurs might scale down knowing marginal returns are taxed 90%, or more income gets funneled

into untaxable forms (perhaps fringe benefits, or moved offshore illegally).

 Labor Supply and Productivity: Will high earners work significantly less if most of their extra income

goes to taxes? This is debated. Historical evidence from periods of high tax rates does not show a clear

drop in overall economic growth or productivity. A study by Romer & Romer examining periods

between the World Wars (with high tax rates) found “higher marginal rates had no significant effect

on productivity [growth] … nor a significant slowing of capital investment or labor force

growth.”. Similarly, the postwar U.S. economy of the 1950s and 60s grew robustly despite top tax rates

of 70–91%. This suggests that the economy can function well with high taxes on the rich, perhaps

because those taxes affect only a small number of people and those people’s core economic decisions

(e.g. whether to launch a business or invent something) are not solely driven by tax rates. On the other

hand, some economists caution that extremely high rates could discourage innovation – the argument is

that the potential for large personal financial reward is a motivator for entrepreneurs and inventors, and a

90% tax on success might reduce that incentive. While hard to quantify, it’s a potential dynamic cost

(less “creative” risk-taking leading to major innovations).

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 GDP Impact Estimates: Putting numbers to it, we can draw from analogous scenarios:

o The Tax Foundation has analyzed the effect of big tax changes and tariffs. They estimate that

making the TCJA permanent (i.e. keeping lower rates) would eventually increase long-run

GDP by a small amount (~0.8% over 30 years) due to supply-side boosts. The flip side

(repealing TCJA) might decrease GDP by a similar small percentage in the long run. However,

our plan overshoots mere repeal (goes to higher rates than pre-2017), so the negative effect could

be larger.

o Conversely, the tariff removal should increase GDP. The trade war tariffs imposed by 2018–

2019 were found to reduce U.S. GDP by roughly 0.9% in the long run (with no foreign

retaliation). If we remove them, we avoid that loss – effectively adding back up to ~1% to GDP

over time, relative to keeping tariffs. One analysis from the Federal Reserve estimated the 2018

tariffs raised core inflation by ~0.1–0.2% and had a modest negative effect on output. So

removing tariffs could lower inflation (see below) and slightly raise output.

o The Penn Wharton model looked at a hypothetical 10% blanket tariff on all imports and found it

would reduce GDP by a larger amount (their extreme scenario of April 2025 tariffs, averaging

>10%, gave a 6% GDP reduction long-run). Our case is removing tariffs averaging maybe 10–

25% on certain goods, so that’s a positive for GDP (though not +6%, because those tariffs

weren’t across the board to begin with, but perhaps avoiding a -0.5% to -1% hit).

o Combining these: we have a negative from higher taxes on growth, and a positive from freer

trade and lower deficits. We expect initially the negative might dominate (tax changes happen

immediately, whereas debt reduction yields benefits gradually). The 15-year horizon might see

a slightly slower average growth rate than otherwise – perhaps on the order of a few basis points

off annual GDP growth. For instance, if baseline growth is 2.0%, maybe it becomes 1.8–1.9%

on average with the high-tax regime (this is speculative). Over the 30-year horizon, however,

the deficit reduction could play a bigger role – a smaller debt burden can increase long-run

growth by crowding in private investment. It’s plausible that by the end of 30 years, GDP could

even be higher than baseline if the debt reduction prevents a fiscal crisis and lowers interest

rates. But standard dynamic scoring (like JCT/CBO) would likely still find a slight drag on longrun

GDP from raising taxes so steeply, because the disincentive effect on work and saving is

usually modeled to outweigh benefits of lower debt (especially when the taxes target high-saving

individuals).

o In sum, we anticipate slightly lower GDP in the medium term than baseline (maybe 1–2%

smaller by year 15), but potentially a similar or improved GDP by year 30 if lower deficits

lead to significantly lower interest rates and higher investment than otherwise. This is

speculative; different models will give different results. For caution, our dynamic revenue

estimates assumed a modest contraction in the tax base relative to static (as seen in Table 1, ~15-

20% less revenue), consistent with some output loss.

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Inflation and Interest Rates

The policy has implications for inflation dynamics and interest rates, through both demand and supply

channels:

 Inflation: Repealing tariffs is disinflationary in the short run, as it directly reduces import prices. As

noted, the 2018 tariffs were estimated to contribute about 0.1–0.2 percentage points to core inflation.

Removing them would likely have a one-time effect of lowering the price level of affected goods (think

of it like a -0.1 to -0.2% off the inflation rate spread over a year or so). This helps consumers and could

slightly ease the burden on the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Additionally, if high-income

consumers have less after-tax income (due to these taxes), they might spend less, which could reduce

aggregate demand a bit – that, too, is disinflationary (though the rich have a lower marginal propensity

to consume than the poor, so the effect may be small). Also, deficit reduction in general can be

disinflationary: by reducing government-induced demand (the government is taking money out via taxes

and not spending it, just paying debt), overall demand in the economy might be lower than otherwise,

alleviating overheating pressures. During high-inflation periods, fiscal contraction (higher taxes or

lower spending) tends to dampen inflation. In the long run, a lower debt-to-GDP can also mean less

pressure to monetize debt, etc. So we expect inflation would be slightly lower under this policy than

otherwise, especially in the first decade. Quantitatively, maybe inflation runs a few tenths of a percent

lower for a couple years due to these factors, but it’s hard to pin down. The main clear effect is the tariff

removal: a Federal Reserve study found that the tariffs increased import price inflation significantly for

the directly impacted categories, but overall core PCE by only ~0.1–0.2%. Thus, we can say repealing

tariffs could shave ~0.1–0.2% off the inflation rate in the near term. That’s not huge, but meaningful

when central banks target 2% inflation.

 Interest Rates: Several aspects influence interest rates:

1. Government borrowing: By greatly reducing deficits, the Treasury’s demand for loanable

funds falls. Basic crowding-out theory suggests this would put downward pressure on interest

rates over time. Less competition for funds means lower yields needed to attract buyers. The

CBO often notes that higher debt leads to higher interest rates (all else equal); conversely,

lowering projected debt should ease rates. With trillions less in debt, it’s conceivable long-term

interest rates (like 10-year Treasury yields) could be modestly lower than baseline – perhaps by

on the order of 20–30 basis points in a decade (as an illustrative guess), growing to maybe 50+

bps lower in the longer term if debt is substantially smaller. Lower interest rates also stimulate

private investment, partially offsetting the tax drag.

2. Federal Reserve response: If inflation indeed comes in lower due to the policies, the Fed may

adopt a looser monetary stance than otherwise, also contributing to lower interest rates.

However, if the economy is running cooler (slightly lower growth), the Fed might also lower

rates to compensate. Essentially, nothing in this plan is inflationary, so we don’t anticipate the

Fed needing to hike rates more; rather, they might even be able to allow rates to be lower.

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3. Risk premiums and confidence: A plan that significantly improves the long-run fiscal outlook

could reduce the “risk premium” on government debt. Investors might see U.S. debt as safer with

a declining debt/GDP, so they demand a smaller premium. This again could reduce yields

slightly relative to a scenario of ever-rising debt.

4. Private credit demand: On the flip side, if after-tax returns to investment are lower, businesses

might invest less and borrow less, which also reduces demand for credit, further easing rates.

However, reduced private investment is not a good thing in terms of GDP (that’s the supply-side

drag), but it does mean less upward pressure on rates from the private sector.

Netting these out, it’s reasonable to expect interest rates to be lower than baseline under this tax regime,

especially in the long run. In the short run, there could be financial market adjustments (for example, if equity

markets fall due to higher corporate taxes, investors might flee to bonds, lowering yields). Over 15–30 years,

the vastly improved federal debt position is a dominant factor. For instance, one study noted that using new

revenue to pay down debt “encourages private investment” by freeing up capital. This likely refers to lower

interest rates enabling more business borrowing and investment. So dynamically, the high taxes might reduce

private investment some, but the lower interest environment could stimulate other investments – a bit of a pushpull.

Bottom line: We assume dynamic modeling would incorporate slightly higher private investment than

otherwise because of deficit reduction, but slightly lower due to tax disincentives. Sophisticated models (like

those at CBO or PWBM) typically find that debt reduction can offset a portion (but not all) of the negative

growth from higher taxes. For example, PWBM compared tariffs vs. corporate tax hike: they noted that using

revenue to reduce debt mitigates harm. In our scenario, all new revenue reduces debt, so that’s a mitigating

factor.

Behavioral Responses and Other Considerations

Tax Evasion/Avoidance: With such high rates at the top, a major dynamic factor is behavioral changes to

avoid taxes. Historically, when top rates were very high, wealthy individuals found creative ways to reclassify

or hide income. In the 1950s, many high earners would turn wage income into capital gains (e.g. actors using

personal corporations) because capital gains were taxed much lower. Our plan tries to close that particular

avenue (since we tax gains as ordinary income). But new schemes could emerge. Some might shift income

overseas or defer compensation. There could be an increase in illegal evasion (offshore accounts,

underreporting) if people feel rates are “confiscatory.” We have assumed stronger enforcement to counteract

this (e.g. more audits for >$10M income folks), but realistically, some avoidance will happen. This reduces the

effective revenue collected and also can show up as lower measured economic activity (since unreported

income doesn’t count in GDP, though the actual work might still be done).

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Migration and Mobility: One behavioral response is that some high-net-worth individuals might emigrate

(leave the U.S.) to avoid the wealth tax or 90% rate. The proposal does include an “exit tax” of 40% on net

worth for those renouncing citizenship (like Warren’s plan), which discourages this but may not fully stop it. If

a number of billionaires or top-earners left, the U.S. could lose not only their tax revenue but also their

entrepreneurship or investment in the domestic economy. This is hard to model, but it’s a risk: the higher the

rate, the bigger the incentive to relocate if possible. In the 1960s, despite 70% top rates, we didn’t see an exodus

of talent – probably because other countries had high rates too or the U.S. market was worth staying in. Today,

global tax coordination would help; otherwise, some may relocate to tax havens.

Laffer Curve Considerations: As mentioned, evidence suggests the revenue-maximizing top income tax rate

is somewhere around 60-70% under normal conditions. At 90%, we might be on the downward slope – meaning

each further increase yields less revenue or even reduces it. However, because we pair it with base broadening

(closing capital gains preference, etc.), the Laffer peak might be higher – perhaps ~75% or more. Still, 90%

likely exceeds it, implying the last 15 percentage points might not raise much and could induce a lot of

avoidance. Our static estimates probably overstate revenue from the top bracket for this reason. Dynamic

scoring would dial that back. For example, Tax Foundation’s analysis of a 70% top rate (as proposed by AOC)

noted that much of the income above $10M might not be realized; they and others (like economist Scott

Greenberg) argued 70% would “likely lead to significant tax avoidance and lower reported income”. A 90%

rate even more so. Thus, the dynamic outcome could be that taxable income for the ultra-rich falls

substantially relative to static projections. We saw an illustration of this in the 1930s data: when rates shot up,

reported income by the rich dropped and revenue gains were muted.

Government Spending and Interest Savings: Although not the focus of the question, it’s worth noting what

happens with the money. We’ve assumed it reduces deficits (i.e. debt). This has positive feedback as discussed

(lower interest burden freeing resources). If instead the revenue was spent on productive public investments

(infrastructure, education, etc.), that could also boost long-run growth – potentially offsetting the tax drag via

higher productivity of the workforce or better infrastructure for business. Post-WWII, high taxes funded

investments like the interstate highways and GI Bill, which had growth payoffs. Our analysis sticks to deficit

reduction, but policymakers might mix uses. Dynamic models often find that if extra revenue is used to reduce

debt, the long-run GDP is higher than if it’s used on transfers or consumption, but certain investments could

also raise GDP. For maximizing deficit reduction’s effect, assume it all goes to debt reduction as we did.

Trade and Global Effects: Repealing tariffs will likely cause an increase in imports and exports (trade

volumes). Consumers benefit from cheaper imported goods (raising their real incomes), and export industries

benefit from fewer retaliatory tariffs and potentially a weaker dollar (if less need to finance deficits, dollar

might adjust). The increase in trade could improve productivity (access to cheaper intermediate goods, etc.).

Some domestic industries that were protected (say, steel) might face more competition, potentially contracting,

but economy-wide resources shift to more efficient uses. The long-run effect of removing a nearly global tariff

regime (as Trump’s was becoming) is to raise global GDP and U.S. GDP modestly. One estimate: a 10%

universal tariff reduces global GDP ~1%, so removing such tariffs avoids that loss. Because our tariffs were

targeted, the effect is smaller but positive.

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Dynamic Revenue Feedback: Incorporating all these factors, our dynamic revenue estimates (as in Table 1)

assumed roughly a 15-20% reduction in total revenue gain compared to static. That is, instead of $30T over 30

years, maybe ~$25T is realized. This accounts for the contraction in the tax base (people earning/realizing less

income under high rates), partially offset by a slightly larger economy due to lower debt and tariffs. For

example, the Penn Wharton model of the wealth tax saw about a 17% drop in 10-year revenue when macro

feedback was included. The Tax Foundation’s dynamic scoring of the TCJA also showed feedback (they found

TCJA’s cuts partly paid for ~20% of themselves via growth) – in reverse, our increases might lose some

revenue via negative growth feedback (a smaller economy yields less tax). But because we’re also improving

factors like interest rates and trade, the net feedback might be closer to neutral or slightly negative. We

conservatively assume a net negative feedback on revenue (hence dynamic revenue is a bit lower).

To summarize dynamic outcomes in a narrative form:

 GDP: Slightly lower in medium term, potentially catching up in long term. Economy likely smaller than

otherwise for a time due to reduced private incentives, but long-run debt reduction and efficient taxation

(fewer distortions like tax shelters) could improve growth prospects. Estimates range from a few percent

lower GDP in 2030 than baseline, to maybe near baseline in 2050. For example, the wealth tax alone

was -1.2% GDP by 2050; adding other high taxes might amplify that, but eliminating tariffs and

lowering debt could counteract it.

 Unemployment: In the short run, taking money out of the economy (via taxes) could soften demand,

possibly raising unemployment slightly until monetary policy offsets it. But with tariff repeal, export

sectors expand. This is complex, but no severe unemployment effects are expected after adjustments; the

labor market might shift (financial sector might shrink a bit, manufacturing could grow with more

exports, etc.).

 Inflation: Marginally lower, as discussed (tariff removal and lower deficits ease inflation).

 Interest Rates: Lower long-run real interest rates due to fiscal improvement, making it cheaper for

businesses to borrow – a pro-growth factor for investment that could mitigate some negative tax effects.

 Budget Health: Improved – lower interest payments (the federal government saves potentially trillions

in interest over decades by paying down debt), creating more fiscal space for future needs.

 Wealth and Inequality: Lower – dynamic model doesn’t capture “inequality” per se, but economically,

wealth concentration would likely decline relative to baseline. That might have socio-economic benefits

(or costs, depending on perspective, like possibly less capital concentration).

 Innovation/Startups: Hard to quantify. Possibly fewer big unicorn IPOs (if founders know 90% of their

gain goes to tax, maybe they sell earlier or don’t start), but also the environment of stable economy and

lower interest could encourage broad investment. Historically, the 1950s–60s had plenty of innovation

(space race, etc.) despite high taxes, suggesting innovation is not purely tax-driven.

In conclusion, the dynamic scoring indicates that while the static revenue gains of this tax overhaul are

enormous, the actual realized revenue would likely be a bit lower after accounting for economic adjustments

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– but still extremely large. We might see, for example, instead of $12T in 15 years, something like ~$10T in

deficit reduction after feedbacks. That is still an unprecedented fiscal improvement. Importantly, none of the

dynamic factors appear to reverse the sign of the budget impact (we still reduce deficits massively; growth

feedback won’t negate the trillions in revenue, it would only trim it). Even under pessimistic assumptions, this

policy package dramatically strengthens the federal fiscal position over the next generation.

Finally, it’s worth noting the broader context: The post-WWII-like tax regime is intended to prioritize

equality and fiscal prudence over maximal growth. The slight sacrifices in private output or efficiency (if

any) are traded for a more balanced budget and reduced inequality. Some studies argue that within reasonable

ranges, higher taxes on the rich have minimal impact on macroeconomic growth – the past decades of tax

cuts did not produce spectacular growth or broad wage gains, and conversely, the high-tax mid-century era had

strong growth. Our analysis suggests that with this modernized approach (including plugging loopholes and

encouraging productive use of revenue), the U.S. could see significant deficit reduction and a more equitable

tax system with only modest impacts on growth and inflation. The policy essentially trades a bit of private

capital accumulation for public balance sheet health.

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Conclusion

Replacing the Trump-era tax cuts with a modern post-WWII-style tax policy would profoundly increase federal

revenue and tilt the tax burden toward the rich and corporations. Over a 15-year horizon, we project on the

order of $10+ trillion in additional revenue (perhaps ~4% of GDP per year on average), rising to around $25+

trillion over 30 years. This would slash deficits and could start to pay down the national debt, improving fiscal

sustainability. High-income individuals (especially the top 0.1%) would pay much more – through a 90%

marginal rate on ultra-high earnings, taxation of investment income at that rate, and a direct wealth tax – while

middle and low-income households would see relatively minor changes (mostly just a reversion of the

temporary 2017 cuts). Corporations would face a dramatically higher 42% tax rate, likely doubling the

corporate tax revenue as a share of the economy, with sectors like tech, finance, and retail contributing large

sums, whereas previously tax-sheltered sectors might continue to pay less unless loopholes are closed.

Regionally, wealthy states and those with many high-earners (California, New York, Texas, Florida, etc.) would

supply a disproportionate share of the revenue, reflecting the geographic distribution of income and wealth.

In dynamic terms, the policy is a mix of demand contraction and supply-side changes: it would likely reduce

inflation modestly (by removing tariffs and lowering deficits), and lower long-term interest rates due to

improved federal finances. These factors help offset some negative effects of higher taxes. There could be some

drag on economic growth and private investment, as high marginal rates might discourage some additional

work or risk-taking and lead to avoidance behaviors. However, historical evidence suggests the magnitude of

such drag may be limited if the economy has compensating policies and public investments. With robust tax

enforcement and base-broadening, the revenue-maximizing potential of high tax rates increases, meaning the

government can capture substantial revenue with manageable efficiency costs.

Overall, a modernized post-WWII tax policy — featuring very high taxes on the richest taxpayers and

corporations, paired with the removal of protectionist tariffs — would significantly increase federal revenues,

reduce the deficit, and compress after-tax income inequality. The 15-year deficit reduction on a dynamic

basis (accounting for economic effects) might be on the order of $8–10 trillion, and around $20–25 trillion

over 30 years, which would be transformative for the U.S. budget. While the economy might be slightly

smaller in the short-to-medium term than under status quo policy, the benefits of lower debt, lower interest

rates, and a fairer tax distribution could yield a more stable and equitable growth path in the long run.

Sources: Historical tax rates and revenue shares; JCT and CBO projections for TCJA impacts; Penn Wharton

Budget Model for wealth tax and tariff effects; ITEP and Tax Policy Center analyses for distribution by income

and state; Federal Reserve and Tax Foundation research on tariffs and inflation/GDP; Economic studies on

behavioral responses and growth. All evidence indicates that such a sweeping tax change would indeed raise

unprecedented revenue from those with the greatest ability to pay, substantially shrinking deficits over the

next generation while modestly reining in the most extreme accumulations of private wealth. The trade-offs

include careful management of tax avoidance and ensuring the policies do not inadvertently stifle productive

economic activity more than necessary – challenges policymakers would have to navigate in implementation.

When the U.S. adapts and implements a strategy like this to go after wealthy tax cheats, the effects would ripple across economics, politics, public trust, and even the global financial system. A realistic assessment of likely effects both positive and challenging. If done well with transparency, legal precision, international coordination, and firm public backing this strategy could:

• Recover hundreds of billions in stolen wealth, level the playing field for honest taxpayers, and shift the culture of impunity that has benefited the ultra-wealthy for decades to come.

Wealthy donors, lobbyists, and think tanks will declare war on the effort. This could become a partisan wedge, with opposition claiming "the government is coming after success." This plan would require your strong public commitment to keep support.

Tax havens will invent new secrecy structures. Some wealth will shift into untraceable assets (crypto, art, land in non-cooperative countries). We must make constant innovation to stay ahead.

If not done carefully, perceived abuse or mistakes could erode trust. We must avoid becoming a political witch hunt or overreach that hits innocent small businesses. Multinationals will threaten to leave the U.S., reduce domestic investment, or offshore jobs further, showing why we don’t need them. This can be mitigated through global cooperation and minimum tax agreements (like the OECD’s 15% deal).

Adapting the Biden administration’s anti-oligarch asset seizure strategy to target wealthy individuals or corporations evading U.S. taxes or offshoring assets would require a similarly aggressive, multi-agency approach—but tailored for domestic and global tax enforcement rather than geopolitical sanctions.

1. Establish a “Task Force Tax warfare” Whose purpose it is to target ultra-wealthy tax cheats, corporations exploiting loopholes, and offshore havens. Led by the departments of DOJ, IRS Criminal Investigation Division (CI), FinCEN, Treasury, SEC. Their primary focus will be tax evasion, fraudulent shell companies, offshore trusts, and accounting manipulation. They will be tasked with investigating complex financial networks. Use subpoenas and international information-sharing treaties (e.g., FATCA, CRS). Their primary target: facilitators (lawyers, bankers, accountants).

2. International Cooperation: “REPO for Tax Havens” Whose goal it is to share data on offshore accounts, enforce transparency laws, pressure jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands, Panama, etc. We can use some of our existing tools or invent new ones to accomplish our goals. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act), automatic exchange of bank info via CRS (Common Reporting Standard), diplomatic pressure/sanctions on non-cooperative countries are a few tools we can implement today. Using our alliance with U.S. partners with EU, G7, OECD, and others to crack down on tax shelters.

3. Legal Toolkit: Expand Civil & Criminal Forfeiture DOJ seizures of the wealthy assets Allow civil asset forfeiture of properties tied to tax evasion or fraudulent shelters. Prosecute for conspiracy to defraud the IRS, money laundering, bank fraud, false filings. Push for new legislation to close loopholes (e.g., carried interest, fake "non-dom" statuses).

4. Forensic Audit Squads Deploy elite IRS & DOJ-financed audit squads to high-risk financial actors. Use AI/data mining to detect the wealthy’s suspicious filings. Flag wealth movement through shell companies, and partner with whistleblowers and incentivize tips (like the IRS Whistleblower Program).

5. Publicly Track & Report Recoveries Create a public registry showing seized/fined assets and funds recovered for taxpayers. Highlight major wins for the American people:

• "$200 million estate seized from tax-evading hedge fund CEO"

• "$50 million offshore trust brought back into U.S. tax system"

6. Redirect Funds to the Public Use recovered funds to support IRS modernization, reduce public debt or fund middle-class tax cuts. Invest in underfunded services like education or healthcare.

7. Legislative Backbone Push for laws to ban anonymous shell companies (beneficial ownership transparency), enforce a global minimum tax (building on the OECD deal), expand IRS authority and budget (reversing historic underfunding), criminalize certain types of tax haven abuse.

28th Amendment To the Constitution of the United States of America

Women’s Right to Reproductive Health

Section 1 - Right to Abortion

The 28th Amendment protects the right to privacy in healthcare.

• This includes the right for a woman to make decisions about her reproductive health, including the choice to have an abortion and other medical decisions.

• States may establish regulations regarding abortion based on the stages of pregnancy to balance protecting the mother’s health with the potential for human life.

Dividing Pregnancy into Three Trimesters:

1. First Trimester: States shall not regulate abortion.

2. Second Trimester: States may regulate abortion only to protect the health of the mother.

3. Third Trimester: States may regulate or prohibit abortion to protect the potential for human life, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

Section 2 - Addressing Maternal Mortality

To ensure the health and safety of all pregnant individuals, this amendment guarantees access to:

• Comprehensive prenatal and postnatal care.

• Skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care.

• Investments in healthcare infrastructure, particularly in rural and underserved areas.

• Family planning services, including contraception.

• Emergency procedures, such as blood transfusions and cesarean sections, to address childbirth complications promptly.

Section 3 - State Rights

• States have the right to determine specific regulations regarding abortion timeframes, provided they adhere to Section 1 of this amendment.

• Any changes to abortion timeframes must be determined through a public referendum.

• Exceptions for rape, incest, and when the mother’s life is at risk must be uniformly recognized and implemented.

Section 4 - Funding

To ensure the successful implementation of this amendment, Congress shall allocate federal funding as follows:

1. Federal Appropriations:

   • Congress will appropriate funds annually to support reproductive healthcare initiatives, including maternal health programs, abortion services, and family planning resources.

   • These funds will be administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure equitable distribution nationwide.

2. Grant Programs:

   • HHS will establish competitive and formula-based grant programs to assist states, healthcare providers, and community organizations in:

     • Expanding access to prenatal and postnatal care.

     • Improving healthcare infrastructure in underserved and rural areas.

     • Training healthcare professionals to address maternal and reproductive health needs.

   • Grant applications will prioritize initiatives that reduce disparities in reproductive healthcare access and outcomes.

3. Oversight and Accountability:

   • A national advisory board will oversee the allocation and use of funds, ensuring compliance with the goals of this amendment and transparency in expenditures.

Section 5 - Ratification Clause

• States must ratify this amendment within one calendar year of its passage by Congress.

• If a state fails to ratify the amendment within the allotted time, it will be presumed to have no objections, and the amendment shall proceed as if ratified by that state.

We, the people of the United States, declare that the expenditure of money in politics does not constitute free speech but instead amplifies certain voices disproportionately. To restore fairness and ensure equal representation, we find this practice no longer acceptable. Through this amendment, we affirm the necessity of limiting the influence of money and external entities in American elections, enhancing transparency, and implementing measures for ethical modern governance to preserve our democracy for future generations of Americans.

Section 1 - Elections

Public Funding:

1.      A General Election Fund shall be established to publicly finance campaigns for federal elections.

2.      Congress shall allocate funds annually, to be equitably distributed among states and territories based on the number of candidates.

3.      Election officials in each state and territory shall be responsible for distributing funds equally among qualified candidates.

4.      Any candidate found in violation of funding regulations shall forfeit all campaign funds and may be disqualified from candidacy.

5.      Audits shall be conducted biannually to ensure compliance, with penalties imposed for misallocation or misuse of funds.

Donations and Contributions:

1.      Individual contributions to political campaigns shall be permitted with a maximum limit of $5,000 USD per individual per calendar year, subject to adjustment for inflation by a two-thirds majority vote in the House of Representatives.

2.      Contributions must originate exclusively from United States citizens. Contributions from foreign entities, organizations with foreign affiliations, or non-citizens are strictly prohibited.

3.      Political Action Committees (PACs) are prohibited.

4.      Anonymous or pooled contributions are prohibited.

5.      Immediate family members and staff of government officials are prohibited from making contributions exceeding the individual limit.

6.      Audits shall be conducted biannually to ensure compliance, with penalties imposed for violations.

Spending on Campaigns:

1.      All election-related expenditures must be conducted solely by the candidate's official campaign.

2.      Outside organizations are prohibited from funding, advertising, or otherwise influencing campaigns directly or indirectly.

3.      Candidates are prohibited from accepting funds, goods, or services from any organization for personal or campaign purposes. Violations shall result in the forfeiture of campaign funds and immediate disqualification from the election.

4.      Audits shall be conducted biannually to ensure compliance, with penalties for violations.

Elections:

1.      All general elections for federal offices shall be conducted by popular vote.

2.      The Electoral College is hereby abolished.

Political Parties:

1.      Political parties are prohibited from directly interfering in election activities beyond advising and organizing.

2.      Candidates shall function as independents in all respects except for alliance-building purposes.

3.      Political parties shall implement ranked choice voting for primary elections and candidate endorsements.

Election Cycles:

1.      Campaign activities, including fundraising, advertising, and public appearances for election purposes, are restricted to the six months preceding an election.

2.      Any candidate violating this timeline shall be disqualified from participating in the current election cycle.

Section 2 - Government Officials: Limits and Accountability

Term Limits:

1.      Members of the House of Representatives may serve a maximum of four terms (8 years).

2.      Senators may serve a maximum of two terms (8 years).

3.      Supreme Court justices are limited to a single term of 25 years.

4.      Term limits shall apply prospectively to officials assuming office after the ratification of this amendment.

Post-Government Employment Restrictions:

1.      A five-year waiting period is required for former government officials and employees before engaging with industries or businesses that interact with the government.

2.      Immediate family members of officials and staff are similarly restricted.

3.      Individuals transitioning from industries tied to the government must observe a five-year waiting period before campaigning or assuming elected office.

Judicial and Executive Accountability:

1.      The head of the Department of Justice shall be an elected position, independent of presidential oversight, to ensure impartiality in upholding the law.

2.      Members of the judicial branch may be publicly investigated, impeached, and prosecuted for violations of the law.

3.      Investigations shall commence promptly upon the discovery of credible evidence, without preference to position or status.

Government Immunity and Accountability:

1.      The President of the United States is subject to prosecution under the law, with no immunity for actions related to constitutional, official, or personal conduct.

2.      Government officials and employees may be held accountable for state, local, and federal crimes.

3.      Government officials, their staff, and immediate family members are prohibited from receiving pardons for crimes committed during their tenure.

Executive Branch Oversight:

1.      All actions taken by the executive branch must be documented and accessible to the public unless classified for legitimate national security reasons.

2.      Executive orders shall not contradict existing laws or circumvent legislative authority unless explicitly authorized by Congress.

3.      Emergency powers must be approved by Congress within 30 days and renewed periodically by a simple majority vote.

4.      Pardons powers must be approved and reviewed by the judicial branch for conflicts of interest, The president may not pardon friends, family, employees and others close to the president.

Section 3 - Transparency and Financial Ethics

Prohibition on Receiving Items of Value:

1.      Government officials and employees are prohibited from accepting items of value, including but not limited to trips, vacations, food, drink, entertainment, monetary gifts, or educational benefits, in connection with their official duties.

2.      Immediate family members and staff of officials are similarly restricted.

Stock and Cryptocurrency Ownership:

1.      Government officials and employees are prohibited from owning, trading, or profiting from stocks, cryptocurrencies, or similar assets during their tenure.

2.      Officials must divest such assets three years before assuming office and are prohibited from trading for three years after leaving government service.

3.      Immediate family members and staff are subject to the same restrictions.

Non-Profit Campaign Organizations:

1.      Campaigns shall no longer be classified as non-profit organizations and shall be treated as taxable entities.

Financial Disclosure:

1.      All government officials and employees must submit annual financial reports detailing assets, debts, income sources, and any items of value received.

2.      Financial disclosures shall be publicly accessible in a centralized database.

3.      Additional disclosures may be requested by public petition or congressional inquiry, with findings made publicly available.

Section 4 - Digital Bill of Rights

1.      Individuals have the right to digital privacy, including control over personal data and protection from unauthorized surveillance.

2.      Internet access shall be recognized as a fundamental right, with measures taken to ensure equitable access.

3.      Freedom of expression in digital spaces shall be upheld, provided it complies with lawful standards.

4.      Digital creations and data are the property of their creators, with ownership rights protected.

5.      Decisions made by automated systems must be transparent, equitable, and non-discriminatory.

6.      Cybersecurity shall be prioritized as a public good, with protection for all citizens.

7.      Digital literacy shall be promoted to enable effective exercise of digital rights.

Section 5 - Business entities, labor and fair tax

Labor and Fair Taxation:

1. Right to Organize

Workers shall have an unalienable right to organize in any manner they choose, including but not limited to unions or alternative organizational structures.

2. Pay Equity

Regardless of class, creed, religion, ethnicity, or heritage, pay equity shall remain a top priority.

3.      Taxation of Executive Compensation

Compensation for CEOs and other executives shall be fully taxed, regardless of the form or structure of the organization providing it.

Business entities:

1.      Corporate Accountability and Limitations

1.      The people shall be free from censorship of any kind by Business entities.

2.      Business entities shall not be considered "people" under the law and, therefore, shall not receive the same rights as individuals.

2.      Taxation on Global Cross-Border business Entities

1.      All global cross-border business entities shall pay a standardized tax on their total revenue.

a.      Initial Tax Rate: 23.01% for all cross-border businesses.

b.      Tax Adjustments: Changes to this tax rate require a two-thirds majority vote in the House of Representatives.

3.      Government Employment Restrictions:

1.      Individuals transitioning from industries tied to the government must observe a five-year waiting period before campaigning or assuming elected office.

4.      Obligation to Serve the Social Good

1.      Business entities operating in the United States must prioritize the public's well-being above profits and losses.

2.      Business entities shall not discriminate for or against any individual based on class, creed, religion, ethnicity,  heritage or sexual identity.

5.      Internet Neutrality Obligations

1.      Business entities must maintain a neutral internet environment, offering services and results without bias, favoritism, or discrimination.

6.      Adherence to the Digital Bill of Rights

1.      All business entities operating within the United States must comply with the provisions outlined in the Digital Bill of Rights.

Ratification Clause:

·         States must ratify this amendment within one calendar year of its passage by Congress.

·         If a state fails to ratify the amendment within the allotted time, it will be presumed to have no objections, and the amendment shall proceed as if ratified by that state.